We consider a two-stage model of locational choice. Firms decide in which of three locations (or countries) to build plants; they then compete in all three markets. Knowledge spillovers reduce marginal costs in agglomerations; through intra-firm spillovers these cost reductions can be exported to other locations. We show that improvements in the exchange of information within firms make agglomeration more likely, because knowledge obtained in the center can be transmitted to other locations more easily. Decreases in transportation costs tend to destabilize agglomerations, since competition for peripheral locations increases, which decreases the value of knowledge obtained in agglomerations. 
agglomerations to such a "peripheral location" will only be possible if intra-firm communication is sufficiently cheap. Therefore, agglomerations are easier to support with low communication costs: a greater part of the knowledge gained in these locations will be transferred to the periphery, where it serves to increase profits.
In addition, our analysis sheds light on the effects of transportation costs on locational patterns: decreasing transportation costs may weaken agglomerations. Essentially, if transportation costs are low, the profits a firm earns in the periphery are low: despite the fact that the firm is the only local producer, competition from the center is intensive.
Hence, the gains from building a plant in an agglomeration are small: these gains arise mainly because the knowledge obtained in the agglomeration serves to increase monopoly profits in other locations. With sufficiently low transportation costs, these monopoly profits may become too small to justify a plant in an agglomeration. This paper makes the above arguments more precise. We specify under which conditions the combination of locational and intra-firm spillovers leads to agglomerations. We then use our results to show that lower communication costs and higher transportation costs may strengthen agglomerations.
Several empirical examples show that locational decisions of multi-plant firms are influenced by the desire to obtain knowledge in agglomerations with the goal of reducing costs elsewhere. In the nineteen-sixties and seventies, Japanese firms practiced "technological sourcing" (Neven and Siotis, 1995) . They entered markets in Europe and the United States in order to gain access to the know-how of competitors. This knowledge was then transmitted to their plants in Japan, where it was used to design their own products and productive processes. In turn, the flow of knowledge from Japanese plants to their U.S. transplants has been important recently: intra-firm channels enabled Japanese companies to reach a productivity in the United States close to the level in the Japanese plants.
1 Also, the presence of intra-firm channels has been important in the location decisions of Japanese and US firms within the United States. As argued by Head et al. (1995) , initial investments by Japanese firms attracted subsequent investors in the same industry or industry group who wanted to gain access to the knowledge present in these states. Another example for the importance of intra-firm communication channels comes from the banking sector:
German banks recently moved some of their activities to London. For this move, learning from the London banking scene was an important motivation (Economist, 1995) .
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we formulate a two-stage game of locational choice by duopolists. In section 3, we characterize the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game. In section 4, we apply the results to analyze the effects of informational integration (decreasing communication costs). Section 5 deals with the effects of transportation costs. Section 6 shows how our results can be extended from price competition to more general forms of oligopolistic interaction. Section 7 concludes.
A Two-Stage Model of Locational Choice
Consider the following two-stage game with two firms, A and B, and three locations, 1, 2, and 3.
The first stage
In the first period, both firms decide in which of the three locations, if any, to acquire production capacities. If a firm acquires capacities, it has the option to produce in that location in period 2. The first-period choices of the two firms are summarized by vectors First-period location decisions affect marginal production costs δ as follows.
1.
At a location where only one firm has a plant, marginal production costs are given as δ =H if there is no other location where both firms have a plant (a joint location).
2.
At a joint location, δ =L=0.
3.
If a joint location exists, marginal production costs at a location where only one firm has a plant, are given as δ =M= (1 − γ )H , where
The rationale for this distinction is as follows.
First, the assumption that production costs are low (L=0) 2 when both firms are at the same location captures the notion of technological spillovers, as discussed by Marshall (1920) .
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For instance, suppose that through learning by doing an increase of productive efficiency arises as a joint product with output in each firm. Even if the decision makers in two firms start with the same level of experience in their activities, the trial and error process of learning may lead to different outcomes and therefore to different productivities (see Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1995) . Hence, a firm might enjoy a greater productivity increase if it has easy access to knowledge of competitors. Access may be facilitated by geographical proximity, because it simplifies labor rotation between firms and communication between employees (see Jaffe et al. 1993 , Head et al. 1995 , Audretsch and Feldman 1996 . Thus, proximity may foster the exchange of different learning experiences, and firms that are close to others may achieve greater cost reductions than firms in isolated locations. 4 Second, we assume that at least some of the knowledge generated at one location can be transferred to other plants within the same firm. In other words, a firm that benefits from locational spillovers in one location also has lower production costs elsewhere; this is reflected in the inequality H ≥ M. Empirical studies suggest that intra-firm channels are used extensively in multi-plant firms. For instance, Baily and Gersbach (1995) show that companies that have achieved high productivity in one location have been able to replicate almost the same productivity advantage in their other plants in industrialized countries. 
The second stage
In period 2, firms compete in all three markets. The local demand in each location is given as a monotone decreasing function D(p), where p is the product price; in particular, locations are identical in terms of demand. We assume that firms will attempt to maximize the sum of profits in all three locations. Therefore, firms will choose to serve each location in the cheapest possible way. To sell goods at a location where production does not take place, a firm must incur transportation costs of T for each unit of the good. Joint locations will therefore always be served locally, because this involves the smallest possible marginal costs of L=0. Similarly, locations where the firm does not produce will be served from joint locations whenever joint locations exist, because this involves the smallest possible total marginal costs of T. Periphery locations where the firm has a plant will be served locally if no joint location exists or if M<T.
Given the production capacities and the resulting costs in each location, both firms compete simultaneously on all three markets. In order to simplify the exposition, we first assume assume that the firm's marginal costs are independent of its own number of plants. This can be justified if the correlation between the learning experiences in different plants of the same firm is high relative to the correlation between learning experiences of different firms. 6 If localization advantages arise from labor pooling and common suppliers (see footnote 3) and not only from spillovers, γ < 1 is even more natural: only those cost reductions that are the result of knowledge spillovers can be transferred easily to other locations.
Bertrand competition, i.e., firms produce homogeneous goods and compete in prices in each location, so that, for each firm, a second-period strategy consists of a price for each combination of locations and first-period strategies s A , s B ( ). This assumption highlights sharp competition; we shall show in section 6 how our ideas generalize to other forms of competition.
We shall assume that profits obtained in one location are independent of actions taken in other locations. Hence, we can think of a Nash equilibrium in the second period as a combination of three Nash equilibria, one in each location. Because of Bertrand competition, for each location l there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the production game corresponding to marginal costs δ A l and δ B l of serving this location. The resulting gross duopoly profits for firms A and B in location i are written as 
We can write the total secondperiod payoff of firm A as
and similarly for B. Indices will be dropped whenever convenient. For example, if locational choices are s A = 1,1,0 ( ) and s B = 0,1,1 ( ) and M<T, we obtain
To obtain net profits, fixed costs have to be subtracted. Thus, net profits in the example are Π M,T ( )− 2F for both firms.
Equilibria
In the following, we describe which first-period choices (s A , s B ) can arise as parts of subgame perfect equilibria for parameter constellations satisfying our general assumptions.
We limit our discussion to equilibria in which both firms are active. 
The following proposition gives conditions under which the two equilibria will arise. 
Proposition 1. With Bertrand competition,
(i) s A = (0,0,1); s B = (1,1, 0) [ ] (DIFFERENTIATIONΠ(H, H + T ) ≥ F (1) M ≥ T (2) or Π(H, H + T ) ≥ F (1) 2Π(H,H + T ) − 2F ≥ 2Π(M,T ) − 3F (3) (ii) s A = (1,1,0); s B = (0,1,1) [ ] (
AGGLOMERATION) is an equilibrium if and only if
conditions (4) and (5) hold simultaneously.
The proof involves a simple check of best-response conditions (see appendix). To understand the conditions for the differentiation equilibrium, suppose first that firm B, which has two plants in equilibrium, deviates by building an additional plant in a joint location. First of all, such deviations cannot be profitable if M ≥ T; in this case, the firm would never use the plants outside the joint location, and it would earn zero gross profits. Now suppose M<T. Then, because of Bertrand competition, firm B still earns zero profits in the joint location. However, the additional plant has an ambiguous effect on profits in locations where firm B produces on its own: on the one hand, the cost reduction in the center helps to reduce costs in the periphery through intra-firm spillovers. On the other hand, the competitor benefits from the joint location because he can serve the periphery at costs T rather than H+T. In each of the two locations where the deviating firm B produces on its own, it therefore obtains profits Π(M,T ) rather than Π(H, H + T ) before the
, which is always the case if transportation costs are sufficiently high, the deviating firm will obtain higher profits than before in the locations where it produces on its own. Total deviation profit is 2 Π(M,T ) -3F. Comparing this with the profit firm B obtains in the differentiation equilibrium (2 Π(H, H + T ) -2F), we see that,
for M<T, the deviation will be unprofitable if and only if condition (3) holds.
Similar considerations show that firm A does not deviate by building a plant in a joint
It is simple to show that this condition is implied by (3).
As to the agglomeration equilibrium, note that this can only occur if M<T: otherwise, firms
would not use their plants in the periphery; it would be cheaper to serve the periphery from the center. In particular, firms would make zero gross profits, because there is no location that they can serve cheaper than the competitor. Even if M<T, lower costs in the periphery resulting from the joint location must outweigh the greater intensity of competition and the fixed costs (condition (5)).
To sum up, despite tough competition (as captured by the Bertrand assumption), an agglomeration equilibrium rather than a differentiation equilibrium may result if intra-firm spillovers are sufficiently strong: because of these spillovers, firms are willing to incur losses in the agglomeration if this leads to sufficiently strong profit increases in periphery locations.
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Finally, note that the two equilibria are mutually exclusive.
Corollary. There is no combination of parameters for which a differentiation equilibrium
and an agglomeration equilibrium exist at the same time.
The corollary follows immediately from proposition 1. Intuitively, for an agglomeration equilibrium, the best response to s B = (1,1,0) is s A = (0,1,1) , while for a differentiation equilibrium the best response to s B = (1,1,0) is s A = (0,0,1) . These two requirements are incompatible, since the strategy of firm B is the same in both cases.
The Effects of Informational Integration
In this section, we examine the effects of informational integration on locational patterns.
Informational integration corresponds to an increase of γ , for instance, as a result of better intra-firm communication. As a benchmark, we first consider the case without intra-firm spillovers ( γ = 0 ).
Proposition 2.(i) Without intra-firm spillovers ( γ =0), there will never be an agglomeration equilibrium under Bertrand competition. (ii) Under Bertrand competition, an increase in informational integration ( γ ) makes
agglomeration equilibria more likely and differentiation equilibria less likely.
Proof. (i) For γ =0, (5) never holds, because Π(M,T ) − Π(H, H + T ) = Π(H,T ) − Π(H, H
(ii) An increase in γ increases Π(M,T ) = Π((1− γ )H,T ) and leaves all other terms in proposition 1 unaffected. The result therefore follows immediately from proposition 1.
Proposition 2 indicates that informational integration tends to work in favor of
agglomerations. With Bertrand competition, production in agglomerations is never worthwhile when there are no internal spillovers. Even though external technological spillovers reduce costs in the agglomeration, competition is so sharp that producing in the agglomeration will not be worthwhile: net profits are negative. With internal communication, however, a part of the cost reduction in the center can be exported to the periphery. This cost reduction in the periphery increases monopoly profits. The better the internal communication, the greater this positive effect of entering agglomerations.
A numerical example
As an example of the effects of numerical integration, we consider the following specification of our model. The demand in each location is given by
D(p)=a-p.
Transportation costs are assumed to be sufficiently high, so that a firm that is the only local producer can set monopoly prices. In a location where both firms are present, firms compete à la Bertrand and make zero profits. Applying standard formulae for monopoly choices of prices and quantities with linear demand, we obtain: 
The Effects of Trade Integration
Reductions in trade costs are often seen as favorable to the emergence of agglomerations, because they make it more attractive to serve large areas from central locations. In the following, we shall give a reason why reductions in trade costs might lead to the dissolution of agglomerations.
First, note that decreasing transportation costs increase the competition in the periphery, and thus also decrease the value of knowledge obtained in a joint location, and hence the profit obtained in periphery locations in an agglomeration equilibrium ( Π(M,T ) ).
However, decreasing transportation costs also lower profits in monopoly locations in the differentiated equilibrium ( Π(H, H + T ) ). Thus, it is not evident whether decreasing transportation costs favor agglomeration; a clear-cut result requires a monotonicity assumption about Π(M,T ) − Π(H, H + T ) . Clearly, this expression is decreasing in T for
T<M. For T>M, however, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Π(M,T ) − Π(H, H + T ) is non-decreasing in T for T>M.
At the end of this section, we shall show that this assumption holds under fairly general conditions on demand functions.
Proposition 3. Suppose assumption 1 holds. (i) Reductions in trade costs make joint location equilibria less likely. (ii) For suitable parameter values, a reduction of transportation costs can lead to the replacement of agglomeration equilibria by differentiation equilibria.
Proof. See appendix.
The proposition suggests that a reduction in transportation costs may favor deglomeration. This is precisely opposite to the case of informational integration, which favored agglomeration. The intuition for this result is as follows. In our setting, the only reason to produce in an agglomeration is to obtain spillovers that, through intra-firm communication increase profits in peripheral locations. These profits are only significant when transportation costs are high. Reducing transportation costs therefore decreases the profits Π(M,T ) of a firm in a periphery location that also has a plant in a joint location. This tends to favor deglomeration. On the other hand, of course, higher transportation costs also increase the profits of a firm producing in an isolated location when there is no joint location ( Π(H, H + T ) ), which favors agglomeration. Assumption 1 makes sure that the former effect dominates over the latter. Figure 1 illustrates the proposition; note that the relevant parameter area for part (ii) is the interval between ˜ γ and γ * .
Fig. 1. The effects of integration
We are left with a justification of the assumption that the expression
It is for instance satisfied if the following two conditions hold simultaneously:
where p δ is the monopoly price for marginal costs δ .
b) D(T)(T-M)-D(H)T is increasing in T.
The first condition is interpreted as follows. As soon as the transportation costs are high enough to guarantee that the competitor's marginal costs (including transportation) are higher than the monopoly price, a firm will set the monopoly price. A further increase in T will have no effect on profits. A firm that produces with marginal costs H, while the competitor produces with H+T, charges the monopoly price as soon as H + T > p H , or equivalently, T > p H − H ; a firm that produces with marginal costs M while the competitor produces with T charges the monopoly price as soon as T > p M . Hence, for
11 Condition a) is relatively easy to fulfill. It holds if there is no overshifting of the original increase in marginal costs on monopoly prices.
12
The expression in b) gives Π(M,T ) − Π(H, H + T ) in the case that transportation costs are so low that neither firm chooses the monopoly price. Condition b) amounts to 
12 Using the standard monopoly pricing formula, a) can be rewritten as 
Beyond Bertrand Competition
So far, we have restricted our attention to price competition with homogeneous goods. In the following, we shall briefly demonstrate that this assumption is not crucial to our results.
We can extend the analysis to price competition with differentiated goods, quantity competition, etc., as long as the following requirement is satisfied.
The left-hand side of this inequality is an upper bound on the profits a firm can make using one plant if there is no location where it produces on its own. It captures the notion of sufficiently intense price competition: without any spatial differentiation, firms will not find production worthwhile. The assumption is trivially fulfilled for Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods because the left-hand side is zero, but it clearly holds for more general situations.
The proof is a straightforward generalization of proposition 1. Assumption 2 suffices to guarantee that production in more than one joint location is never worthwhile, and it also makes sure that a firm will never produce in a joint location if there is no other location where it is the only producer.
Proposition 4 also shows that the effects of informational integration carry over to the more general case. We obtain the following result. 
Summary and Conclusions
Using a simple framework, this paper identified a potentially important element in the generation of agglomerations: the existence of knowledge spillovers within multiplant firms. If such internal spillovers are present, (partial) agglomeration may even result when, without such spillovers, the forces of competition would induce firms to produce at different locations.
Using these results, it turned out that improved informational integration makes agglomerations more likely. This contradicts the popular perception that reductions in communication costs will unambiguously favor deconcentration. 14 Furthermore, decreasing transportation costs may make agglomerations less likely, because they reduce the increase in local monopoly rents obtained through knowledge spillovers from the center to the periphery. This observation contrasts with familiar results from the economic geography literature. For instance, Krugman (1991) emphasizes the idea that reductions in transportation costs lead to agglomeration on a macroeconomic scale, because it becomes cheaper to serve the entire world from a central location. This is also a possibility in our model, but the combination of intra-firm spillovers and increasing competition for the periphery introduces a countervailing effect.
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Therefore, we only need to consider the following deviations. First, for each equilibrium, we need to make sure that firms would not gain from closing down production in all locations, that is, total profits for each firm are non-negative (conditions (1) and (4)).
Second, we need to guarantee for the differentiation equilibrium that neither firm wants to deviate by building an additional plant in a location where the competitor produces ( (2), (3)). Third, for the agglomeration equilibrium we must guarantee that neither firm gains from closing down the plant in the joint location (5).
Proof of Proposition 3. First, recall that for T < M , agglomeration equilibria do not exist.
Hence, for T < M increasing T leaves the condition for agglomeration equilibria unaffected. From now on, suppose T>M. To prove the second statement, we introduce two critical values for γ and T. T* is defined by Π(H, H + T*) = F ; γ * is defined by 2Π((1 − γ *)H,T *) = 3F . T* and γ * do not always exist. We reformulate the second statement as follows.
(ii) Suppose that T* and γ * exist. Moreover, assume that To prove (ii), the following lemma will be used. [
Therefore, the differentiation equilibrium exists for T ∈ T*,T 1 (γ ) [ ], where, for γ ≤ γ * , T 1 (γ ) is defined as the maximal T that solves (3). For T<T*, condition (1) is violated; for T > T 1 (γ ) , the construction of T 1 (γ ) and assumption 1imply that (3) does not hold .
(ii) This follows immediately from assumption 1 and the fact that condition (3) is easier to satisfy for lower values of γ .
(iii) This follows from the fact that (1) is violated if T* does not exists, and that (3b) is violated if γ > γ *, or if γ * does not exist.
We now return to the proof of part (ii) of proposition 3. We show that for suitable values of γ both agglomeration and differentiation equilibria exist, depending on the level of T. (12) implies that there exists a T 
